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The Earth As Eggshell Victim: A Global
Perspective on Domestic Regulation
Alfred C. Aman, Jr.t
In 1891, in a small schoolroom in Waukesha, Wisconsin, 12 year-old
George Putney scuffled with 14 year-old Andrew Vosburg and kicked him in
the shin. The kick would hardly have injured a healthy child; however,
Vosburg was not healthy. The kick aggravated Vosburg's tibia infection,
causing him serious injury. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held George
Putney liable for all the damages that followed, even though Putney did not
know of Vosburg's weakened condition. In the now famous case of Vosburg
v. Putney,' the Wisconsin Court enunciated the common law doctrine since
known as the "eggshell skull" or "thin skull" rule: you take your victim as you
find him.
The thin skull rule is a productive starting point for a dialogue on the
place of law in any effort to control (or reverse) the cumulative damage to the
planet's ecosystem. Any such dialogue requires a global perspective that fuses
international and domestic approaches to law.2 Environmental law must assess
not only the level of assault against the earth, but also the risk of the planet's
hypervulnerability to further injury. As in Vosburg v. Putney, some of the
insult to the planet has been the result of unintended consequences, whose
significance we are only now beginning to understand. The planet has become
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the helpful comments I received on the draft of this comment by Dr. Thomas Drennen and Professors
Robert Fischman, Aviva Orenstein, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Don Gjerdingen, Carol Greenhouse, David
Williams and Susan Williams.
1. 50 N.W. 403 (Vis. 1891). For an earlier Wisconsin case reaching a similar doctrinal conclusion,
see Stewart v. City of Ripon, 38 Wis. 584, 590-91 (1875). See generally, W. PAGE KEErON Er. AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 291-92 (5th. ed. 1984). For modem cases applying
this doctrine see, e.g., Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1983); Jordan v.
Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry., 934 F.2d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1991).
2. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 154-56 (1992). In the "global
discourse," international and domestic approaches are no longer at different "levels" of law, but are in
dialogue on the global "level." Id. Global refers to the impact of a broad political and legal consciousness
that is especially concerned with worldwide forces and their relevance to domestic law. Some of these
forces are environmental and involve various global commons' issues that can only be addressed
collectively. Global thus implies international, but the reverse is not necessarily true. While international
issues and international law, in particular, focus primarily on the law among nations, the term global
focuses primarily on domestic legal responses to worldwide conditions.
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an eggshell victim of industrialization, population growth and the expansion
of the consumer society.
In the case of the global environment, unlike Vosburg, we cannot point to
a single culprit. The causes of environmental damage are multiple. But, as in
Vosburg, the whole "body"-the earth-is an irreducible unit of analysis. True,
pollution-Putney's kick-emanates from different countries and regions and
with differing degrees of intensity, but its global environmental impact is
general and cumulative. True, pollution, toxicity and damage to the global
commons3 are byproducts of processes to be "assimilated" at home or abroad.
Yet, viewed from the vantage point of the eggshell doctrine, the interests of
the earth are prior to the interests of any particular nation, industry, or
individual. To claim otherwise would be tantamount to asserting that Vosburg
was unharmed, except at the precise spot where Putney's shoe made contact
with Vosburg's shin. The aspect of Vosburg that I believe clarifies an approach
to the environment is not Putney's liability, but the implicit distinction the
judge drew between kicking someone's shin, and kicking the shin of someone
who is already weakened. The judge made Putney responsible for full damages
to Vosburg because Vosburg's infection made him so vulnerable as to render
Putney's assault serious, when it otherwise might have been a trivial incident.
As in Vosburg, responsibility for the global environment should be measured
in terms of the impact of the assault, which is one episode in a long term
process of cumulative injury. Pollution is part of an ongoing process-just as
the injury Putney delivered to Vosburg involved not merely "an act" but an
incident in Vosburg's medical history.
Once Putney's act was connected to another person with unique qualities,
it was no longer merely an act, but an element of the relationship between the
two boys. Pollution, too, can be viewed as an element in a vast set of
relationships, linking polluters through the global environment to all other
people now living. That environment is severely debilitated and accordingly,
those relationships are, at present, destructive ones. The eggshell victim
doctrine is relevant to the collective responsibility we bear for the earth's
condition. It is this perspective that I wish to articulate more fully in
commenting on Professor Stewart's article. I deal primarily with the premises
of this perspective rather than problems of implementation.
3. By global commons I mean, particularly, resources such as the atmosphere and the global climate
that are not and cannot be owned by any one particular state. My analysis also includes other commons,
such as parts of the oceans and Antarctica as well as resources such as tropical rain forests that are located
fully in one or within a group of states. The uses and misuses of resources located solely in one state or
a group of states also can affect the planetary environment dramatically. For example, massive deforestation
of the tropical rain forests in Brazil could alter global temperatures. In this sense, such a resource can be
seen as part of the "common heritage of mankind," necessitating global cooperation for its preservation.
See A.B.A. SEC. OF INT'L L. & PRACTICE, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 60-61 (1992)
[hereinafter ABA].
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The purpose of this comment is thus three-fold: (1) to link the relationship
of international trade and domestic environmental regulation to a broader
global discourse; (2) to outline this global discourse, which includes both
international and domestic elements; and (3) to articulate some additional
factors (beyond trade) that are now integral to the relationship between
domestic environmental law and the global regulatory discourse. I maintain
that a global regulatory discourse now exists, and that it involves a logic that
can and should be applied to a much broader array of circumstances than is
now the case. Professor Stewart's article focuses on how concerns about
international competitiveness affect domestic environmental regulation. My
response to Professor Stewart emphasizes that the domestic and international
realms of law and politics have recently merged--conceptually and in fact.
I. THE EGGSHELL PLANET
While Professor Stewart recognizes the role international competition can
play politically, he cites empirical studies that question the overall impact of
domestic environmental regulation on competitiveness. 4 He is, however,
skeptical of the empirical studies5 and argues that-quite apart from whether
there is a connection between environmental regulation and trade-there are
environmental regulatory changes we should undertake for their own sake.
These include greater use of market oriented regulatory techniques and the use
of an approach to environmental regulation that relies on regulatory contracts.6
Inherent in the studies that Professor Stewart cites are two distinct and
important points of view on domestic environmental regulation: that of
individual sovereign nation-states and that of individual corporations capable
of locating their operations anywhere in the world. Neither of these are
sufficiently global points of view. Individual nation-states seek to maximize
their own interests by focusing primarily on the well-being of their own
constituents. This puts a premium on domestic law and domestic politics.
4. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE
L. 2039, 2-71-84.
5. Id. at 2062-71, 2084-86. I, too, am skeptical of some early studies dealing with domestic
environmental regulation and trade. If empirical studies are to be useful, there are a number of factors, often
omitted in the kinds of studies cited by Professor Stewart, that should be measured. See Duane Chapman,
Environmental Standards and International Trade in Automobiles and Copper: The Case for a Social Tariff,
31 NAT. REsouRcEs 449 (1991). Because economists seriously understate environmental costs, they tend
to believe that pollution control and workplace safety are not factors in industrial location. Id. at 456-67.
Professor Chapman discusses six sources of error in analyzing the costs of environmental regulation in the
automobile and copper industries, including: (1) labor costs-such as those incurred in attempting to control
dust in a pit mine; (2) costs of monitoring and planning activities-time spent with inspectors of protection
systems as well as time spent preparing reports and meeting with regulatory officials; (3) the costs of
protecting workers from environmental hazards; (4) productivity losses-i.e. "[w]fien production stops or
is slowed because of environmental problems, this is not counted as an environmental expense"; (5) under-
reporting environmental costs, such as respirators; and (6) opportunity costs for investment in protection
equipment. Id.
6. Stewart, supra note 4, at 2086-97.
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Corporations seek to maximize the interests of their own shareholders and
managers, presenting an even narrower perspective.
While the changes in regulatory approach described by Professor Stewart
may be welcome reforms on the domestic front, I believe that it is primarily
because they resonate with the new global regulatory approaches that they
seem particularly appealing at this point in our history. The impact of domestic
law on the global discourse now developing adds a new and important
dimension to our own domestic regulatory dialogues, one that necessitates a
broader view of national sovereignty as well as of individual or corporate self-
interest.
Elsewhere I have suggested that a new global awareness increasingly
informs our domestic regulatory debates and actions. This shift of
consciousness from a primarily domestic perspective to a more global outlook
is the hallmark of the "global regulatory era.",7 This change of consciousness
has been driven in part by increased and intensified international competition,
especially in the 1980's. Competition among industries that operated in nations
with different, lower, or minimal regulatory requirements helped place the cost
of U.S. domestic regulation in stark relief for policy makers and the public.
Multinational corporations could lower their production costs by relocating
some or all of their manufacturing facilities in parts of the world where
regulatory costs were minimal or nonexistent.8 The cost of domestic regulation
helped fuel the debate in the 1980's that encouraged deregulation, 9 more
efficient regulation," and harmonization of the regulation imposed by the
U.S. and other states."
More importantly, because of the new assumptions emerging about the
nature, functions, and limits of regulation, 2 the complex global regulatory
7. See AMAN, supra note 2.
8. Id. at 78-79; see also Chapman, supra note 5, at 449-450 (arguing that full and accurate assessment
of costs of domestic pollution and workplace safety regulation are likely to be significant factors affecting
productivity, the location of manufacturing, and levels of global pollution). For a discussion of the impact
of lower labor costs or the decisions of some industries to look outside the U.S. when it comes to locating
their manufacturing operations, see ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 69-70 (1991).
9. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfr. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (rescission
of rule requiring air bags).
10. See, e.g., George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
Jan. 28, 1992 (calling for a moratorium on "anti-growth" domestic regulation).
I1. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The U.S. took the lead in drafting this agreement largely because U.S.
regulation of ozone depleting substances was more stringent than that of other competitors. A level playing
field in this case meant extending the U.S. regulatory approach to other countries. See RICHARD BENEDICK,
OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 28-29, 66-67 (1991); David
Doniger, Politics of the Ozone Layer, 4 ISSUES SCi. TECH. 86, 87 (1988).
12. Elsewhere, I have called such sets of assumptions a "regulatory matrix." AMAN, supra note 2, at
3. The term refers to the whole open-ended set of propositions, premises, assumptions, and attitudes that
make a regulatory approach or outcome seem logical, or appropriate to its circumstances. In any society.
at any time, one matrix can generate different, and even rival, models of regulation, since decisionmakers
can justify different positions by drawing on different combinations of the elements of its logic. The
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discourse now developing treats the earth as an eggshell victim. Accordingly,
the logic of this discourse requires that we take seriously international
differences in wealth, culture, and political will that lead to different
perspectives on the environment. Moreover, this global discourse also proceeds
from the premise that an individual country's domestic regulatory approaches
to environmental matters simply may not be enough to protect the eggshell
planet, no matter how effective or efficient they may be in national terms.
II. THE GLOBAL REGULATORY DISCOURSE
A. The Global Perspective
The image of the earth as eggshell victim redirects attention from the
cause of harm to the impact of injury. Accordingly, if pollution is harmful to
the global commons, its source should not be of primary relevance to law and
policy. Simply because the developed world's relative affluence is, in part, the
result of its history of pollution, it does not follow that pollution from less
developed countries should be tolerated in the name of equity or as an
inevitable stage of economic development.' 3 In other words, responsibility is
both retrospective and prospective. 4 The eggshell image also transcends
propositions that focus on how individual corporate entities or countries should
achieve short-term economic success or environmental soundness. From a
global viewpoint, local successes "count" only if they improve planetary
health, not if they simply shift the source or destination of pollution to some
other site. Finally, the eggshell victim image underscores a less obvious long-
term assumption inherent in the global perspective: that the historical process
of the "first world's" economic development cannot be replicated by the
developing world if the environment is to be preserved.' 5 Preservation, in
addition to restoration, will require advances in and new applications of
"green" technologies. Sustainable development must also involve new
institutions, new technologies, and new relationships with our environment.
regulation-deregulation debate of the 1980's is an example of such a contest. For a discussion of these
concepts and a summary of the regulatory matrix that emerged in the deregulatory movement of the 1980's,
see id. at 125-30.
13. Developing countries, however, may legitimately demand assistance from the developed world in
meeting new environmental standards.
14. How that responsibility should be defined and measured in practice, and the precise outlines of
such issues as implementation and enforcement, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
15. See Thomas E. Drennen, Economic Development and Climate Change: Analyzing the International
Response 1-14 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University).
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B. A Global Perspective and Trade
Compared to standard economic approaches, a global perspective on
environmental regulation involves a different view of economic growth and
environmental quality.' 6 Not all forms of economic growth are to be
applauded. For example, if a developing country increases its Gross National
Product in the short run by destroying parts of a rain forest, it is likely to face
higher costs in the long run. If manufacturing in dirty industries increases in
one country, the higher levels of productivity that result are, in reality, reduced
quickly by human costs and, in the long term, by the impact on the global
commons. In short, any strategy by poorer countries to accept low bids in the
market due to their "assimilative capacity"' 7 will only result in higher costs
to their workers and citizens in the form of deteriorating health, safety, and
environmental repair.
In most cases involving less developed countries, the richer countries must
contribute to the necessary funding and technology transfers. To do otherwise
is tantamount to exporting environmental, health, and worker-safety problems
abroad. The idea that poorer countries should bear the costs of environmental
degradation for the sake of their own economic growth not only overlooks the
human costs of such growth, but rationalizes exploitation. This problem is
compounded if the developed world can then take advantage of these "cheap"
goods.' 8 But equity is not the only issue; the eggshell victim doctrine is about
overall vulnerability. If we take the image of the earth as eggshell victim
seriously, some types of pollution, such as ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons
(CFC's), pose a serious threat to the earth, regardless of their source.
Three hypothetical international trade scenarios illustrate how the global
perspective draws the relationship between a nation's overall international
competitiveness and its domestic environmental regulation. The simplest is a
situation in which domestic environmental regulation influences industries'
relocation of their plants and operations. Most multinational corporations
adopting a global perspective would likely prefer one set of rules to a
multiplicity of conflicting legal regimes.' 9 Thus, the relocation of a substantial
16. See, e.g., Robert Repetto, The Need For National Resource Accounting, 93 TECH. REV. 38 (1990);
WORLD RESOURCEs, 1990-91, A REPORT BY THE WORLD RESOURCES INSITrUTE 231-39 (1990).
17. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 2052-53, 2056, 2057-61.
18. Similar problems arose in the negotiations leading to the Montreal Protocol, supra note 11. The
Protocol and its amendments deal with these problems, albeit in less than fully successful ways. See
BENEDICK, supra note II, at 91-92.
19. Because multinational corporations dealing with certain chemicals, for example, may fear liability,
they would have a desire for at least minimal standards to avoid the tragedy and liability of Bhopal. See
Stewart, supra note 4, at 2070-71. Even if such forces for harmonization of legal regimes did not exist, the
idea that different levels of regulation in different nations would lead to efficient relocation and, in effect,
efficient global production ignores the fact that the pollution in any given country will ultimately affect us
all. Increased global pollution or emissions of CO2. for example, will increase the extent of global warming,
not merely the short run production costs of a certain company. Similarly, pollution of other global
commons, such as oceans, will ultimately affect us all. The exportation to the U.S. of fish caught in
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cross-section of industries would strengthen industries' interests in the
harmonization of regulation across various countries. Moreover, the countries
losing industry would likely extend their regulatory approaches to other
countries or lessen the stringency of their regulatory approaches at home.
Whether harmonization would reduce or increase regulation in any one country
would depend on a number of factors, including the persuasiveness of
scientific data involved and political dynamics. Based on the empirical studies
Professor Stewart cites, this hypothetical scenario seems unlikely.20
The second hypothetical is one in which domestic environmental regulation
adversely affects only dirty industries, such as copper mining and refining.
These industries have a strong incentive to relocate to a country where such
regulation is either nonexistent or less costly. This scenario is the most likely,
according to the studies cited by Professor Stewart.2' It also is the scenario
that raises most clearly some of the ethical issues involved in the emerging
global discourse. If increased domestic environmental regulation results in the
displacement of dirty industries, declining emissions of pollutants in one
country will likely result in increased pollution world-wide. It follows that,
from a global point of view, it is not enough simply to set responsible
environmental standards at home. Under the eggshell victim doctrine,
developed nations have a responsibility to help other countries-particularly
developing countries-keep environmental effectiveness at the top of their
economic agendas. Subsidies, along with the creation and transfer of new
environmentally compatible technologies, might all be corollaries to this
second scenario. "
The third hypothetical scenario is one in which no local industry is
adversely affected in the global marketplace by domestic environmental
regulation. Either the percent of production costs this regulation involves is so
small as to be insignificant, or the regulation is so efficient that it is not a
factor in terms of cost. Even under this scenario, a nation adopting a global
perspective realizes that the environmental problems of any nation are the
problems of every nation. Hence, developed nations may, for example, choose
polluted waters abroad is an example of what has been called a circle of poison. See generally S. 898, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) and H.R. 2083, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); DAVID WEIR AND MARK SCHAPIRO,
CIRCLE OF POISON: PESTICIDES AND PEOPLE IN A HUNGRY WORLD (1981); Alice Crowe, Breaking the
Circle of Poison: EPA's Enforcement of Current FIFRA Export Requirements, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REv. 319 (1992).
20. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 2079.
21. Stewart, supra note 4, at 2075-76, 2077-79.
22. See, e.g., Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, arts. 10, 10A, 30 I.L.M. 537, 549-51 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1991)
[hereinafter London Amendments]. Article 10 attempts to provide financial assistance to less developed
countries (LDC's) by creating a mechanism to establish a multilateral fund to help LDC's adapt to new
technologies. Article 10A makes technology transfer an express goal, if LDC's were to adapt to new
environmentally sound approaches to economic growth. See AMAN, supra note 2, at 152.
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to subsidize more stringent regulations in developing nations in order to protect
the global environment.
The relationship between international trade and environmental regulation
may affect the focus of the global perspective in all three contexts, but
regardless of the precise contours of this relationship, a global perspective on
environmental issues is fundamentally different from one conceived in
domestic or even strictly in international terms. No one state acting to regulate
on its own can ignore the possible impact of other nations' decisions. For
example, if the People's Republic of China continued industrialization by
making exclusive use of its own considerable coal reserves, the amount of
global pollution that would result would be enormous, rendering U.S.
regulatory attempts to curb the environmental impact of its air pollution
essentially irrelevant from a global point of view.' Similarly, if the
developing world used CFC's at the same per capita level as used in the
developed world, the impact on the ozone layer would be devastating.24 The
essential point is that even if domestic environmental regulation provides no
incentives for multinational corporations to conduct business elsewhere in the
world, it is impossible, from a global perspective, to ignore the effects of any
nation's environmental decisions on the global commons.2
C. A Global Perspective and Science
Under a global perspective, other countries' approaches to environmental
problems are as important to the global commons as our own. In resolving the
global problem of preserving the environment, the only meaningful unit of
analysis is the planet itself. Of necessity, the physical reality of the global
environment links our domestic efforts with those of other countries. Strong
23. See generally ABA, supra note 3, at 3; PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 190-192 (1993); Top Environmental Official Welcomes Summit Aid Pledges from Developed
Nations-China, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 444 (July 1, 1992), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
INTENV File.
24. The Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, art. 5, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at 6, 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56,
provided the developing world a grace period of up to ten years to comply with the terms of the Protocol,
but it also limited the per capita consumption of CFC's to .3 kg. This amount is well below the developed
world, but even if the developing world were to use only .3 kg CFC's per capita, this additional CFC use
would devastate the ozone layer. See Duane Chapman & Thomas Drennen, Equity and Effectiveness of
Possible CO2 Treaty Proposals, CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES, July 1990, at 16-20.
25. In addition to global commons problems and resources such as the Brazilian rain forest, supra note
3, seemingly wholly domestic environmental issues, such as landfill space for solid waste disposal, may
have global consequences. If, for example, waste can be transported internationally, the high cost of
landfills domestically may encourage an international market for waste. Prohibiting the export of waste
internationally might then necessitate more stringent domestic regulation and affect the political and
economic costs of creating domestic landfills. Allowing the international transport of waste creates the
possibility that poorer countries will become the dumping grounds for the developed world. See generally
Basel Convention On The Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes And Their Disposal,
Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657.
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equitable reasons support this link as well.26 But, as Professor Stewart notes,
countries differ not only in their financial and technological ability to monitor
their own environmental problems, but also in the political will of their leaders
and citizens to deal effectively with environmental issues.27
The connection between green technologies and the political will to invest
in and to implement them highlights the importance of worldwide
communication of scientific discovery and technological innovation. This
includes information technologies that enable the global community to share
data and assess environmental progress globally, as well as on a nation-by-
nation basis. As science and technology increase our ability to measure and
assess the impact on the global atmosphere of pollution emanating from
various nations, they also promote a global perspective on environmental
policy and regulation. Prior to the Montreal Protocol, for example, scientists
hypothesized about the interaction between CFC's and the earth's ozone
layer.28 With satellites and various forms of imaging they now observe the
impact of CFC's on the ozone layer. This ability to theorize and then test these
hypotheses assisted the political task of formulating an environmental issue in
global terms.29
Scientific data and the verification of the environmental theories they make
possible must be accessible to the general public and disseminated widely to
have a chance of political efficacy. Global environmental issues, however, vary
in their political viability and impact. Some, like ozone depletion, have distinct,
damaging effects on individuals (skin cancer, for example), brought about by
dramatic, visible changes in the atmosphere (such as a hole in the ozone layer
above the earth). These issues receive more media and political attention as
well as remedial action than those which appear more abstract, such as
biodiversity, or more local, such as the disappearance of rain forests. It is
difficult both to individualize the impact of these problems and to grasp their
global significance, but they too are global in their scope and effect.3"
26. The developing countries' poverty arguably necessitates wealth transfers in the form of technology
and financial assistance to purchase environmentally sound equipment. Without such help they could not
possibly achieve economic growth in a relatively clean way. More importantly, it may be argued that the
present condition of the planet is due, in large part, to the development approaches used in the past by the
developed world. The developing world is not to blame for the present eggshell condition of the earth. They
have an equitable claim on the assistance of the developed world in helping them to achieve economic
growth in environmentally sound ways and to secure the benefits to their populations that such growth
could produce. For a detailed treatment of such equitable issues in the context of global warming, see
Henry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, 15 LAW & POL'Y (forthcoming 1993). For a
discussion of equity in the context of ozone depletion, see AMAN, supra note 2, at 145, 151-54; BENEDICK,
supra note !1, at 148-62.
27. Stewart, supra note 4, at 2053.
28. See BENEDICK, supra note 11, at 10-12; Mario J. Molina & F. Sherwood Rowland, Stratospheric
Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atomic Catalysed, Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810-12
(1974).
29. BENEDICK, supra note I1, at 14-15.
30. From the point of view of dramatizing the issues involved, the prospect of increased incidences
of skin cancer due to the depletion of the ozone layer is likely to result in greater attention from political
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The global discourse involves specific assumptions about the nature of
science and scientists. First, it assumes that the production of scientific data is
the result of international cooperation among scientists. Second, it assumes that
scientists, particularly multinational panels of scientists, are capable of being
objective and neutral with respect to the analyses of particular global
environmental issues. While these assumptions are contestable, it is important
to recognize the crucial role they play in the global discourse as it now exists
and may continue to develop. Taken together, these assumptions suggest that
a global perspective on regulation is a scientific position. One implication is
that lawyers and politicians can and should turn to science as a means of
resolving policy debates. This does not mean that all scientists will agree on
all issues or that some scientists will not have been politicized. Rather, it
means that a consensus among a cross section of scientists can emerge in
which there is general agreement on what the problem at hand may be, on
what possible solutions may exist and which of these is more or less likely to
succeed. Correspondingly, the global discourse also assumes that science can
contribute to the consolidation and mobilization of political opinion around
particular regulatory proposals.
All these science-based aspects of the global discourse can temper an
exclusively nation-specific point of view on environmental problems and
expand the discourse beyond the relationship between international
competitiveness and domestic environmental regulation. Though
competitiveness is an important aspect of the global discourse, it is just one
part of a broader and ever-deepening global discourse. By focusing on the
planet as eggshell victim, the global discourse has and will have a profound
impact on the genesis and development of new domestic and international
regulatory approaches.
I. EMERGING NEW REGULATORY IMAGES, STRUCTURES,
AND APPROACHES
A. The Global Web
So far, I have considered some of the implications of the emerging global
discourse in environmental regulatory contexts by discussing how its inner
logic might be put into practice. In this Part, I examine how the global
constituencies than the arguably more abstract concern created by the depletion of certain species of
wildlife or by deforestation occurring thousands of miles from one's own country. It is easier to relate to
damage to individuals than it is to damage done on a long term basis to a global commons. Such
individualized damage is closer to the actual facts of Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). We
can more easily identify with localized, specific harm. The ability to dramatize the global harms involved
and the processes that cause them may often be significant factors affecting the politics necessary for the
creation of meaningful global legislation in the form of multinational treaties. See generally Alfred Aman,
The Montreal Protocol and The Future of Global Legislation, 15 LAW & POL'Y (forthcoming 1993).
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perspective has already been emerging. The image of the eggshell planet helps
frame environmental problems in global terms. The image of a web helps
clarify the nature of global corporations and the kind of regulation necessary
if government is to play an effective regulatory role vis-'t-vis corporations on
both national and global levels.
In The Administrative Process, James Landis, an architect of the New
Deal, looked to business and, in particular, the structure of corporations for
inspiration when evaluating the kind of organizational structure government
might follow in regulating these entities:
[W]hen government concerns itself with the stability of an
industry it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial
rather than the political analogue. It vests the necessary powers with
the administrative authority it creates, not too greatly concerned with
the extent to which such action does violence to the traditional
tripartite theory of government organization.3'
Landis was particularly concerned with the structure of administrative agencies.
A formalistic view of separation of powers would have rendered
unconstitutional the combination of functions he believed necessary for New
Deal agencies to be effective. Instead he modeled his organizational and
structural ideas on the more fluid, flexible corporate entities he wished to
regulate.32
Corporations at that time could be viewed as comparable in structure to the
large buildings many of them occupied-many floors high, with the executives
at the top and workers scattered below. The company usually located
manufacturing plants nearby and often kept the materials and inventories
necessary for these plants to function on the premises.33 The corporation of
the twenty-first century, however, is better conceptualized as a global web
rather than an immovable building; it is multinational in its reach, rather than
merely local or national. Thus Robert B. Reich, now Secretary of Labor and
one of the economic architects of the Clinton Administration, describes the
modem corporation and its trading relationships in this manner:
When an American buys a Pontiac Le Mans from General
Motors, for example, he or she engages unwittingly in an international
transaction. Of the $20,000 paid to GM, about $6,000 goes to South
Korea for routine labor and assembly operations, $3,500 to Japan for
advanced components (engines, transaxles, and electronics), $1,500 to
West Germany for styling and design engineering, $800 to Taiwan,
Singapore, and Japan for small components, $500 to Britain for
31. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 11-12 (1938).
32. Id.; see also AMAN, supra note 2, at 13-15.
33. REICH, supra note 8, at 81-82.
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advertising and marketing services, and about $100 to Ireland and
Barbados for data processing. The rest-less than $8,000-goes to
strategists in Detroit, lawyers and bankers in New York, lobbyists in
Washington, insurance and health-care workers all over the country,
and General Motors shareholders-most of whom live in the United
States, but an increasing number of whom are foreign nationals.
The proud new owner of the Pontiac is not aware of having
bought so much from overseas, of course. General Motors did the
trading, within its global web.34
Thus, as Reich goes on to note, in the 1990's, trade cannot be
conceptualized simply as a series of arms-length transactions between buyers
in one nation and sellers in another but between "people in the same web who
are likely to deal repeatedly with each other across borders. '35
An open corporate structure with so international a scope for its operations
requires regulatory language that is flexible and translates easily across
boundaries, if government is to be effective in regulating such entities. The
market-based approaches to domestic regulation Professor Stewart describes
may represent sound regulatory reforms, but if they prove to be widely
adopted, it will be due to the global perspective now emerging. The
corporation of the twenty-first century will be more flexible, multicentered and
global than its twentieth-century ancestors. For such corporations, the global
discourse easily encompasses market-based approaches to regulation because,
like the language of science, the economic language of costs and incentives
translates across national borders and within widespread corporate structures.
Thus, if market-based approaches prevail in the 1990's and beyond, the reason
is likely to be the broader global context in which they operate, and not simply
the substantive regulation-deregulation debate of the 1980's.
Similarly, the contract approach to domestic regulation that Professor
Stewart advocates in his article 6 is also encompassed within the new global
discourse. The contract approach is akin to a regulatory government agency
adopting various bilateral treaties with individual, multinational companies.
Since such corporate entities easily can shift their operations from country to
country or from division to division in their own corporate web, a regulatory
web is needed if government is to do more than simply encourage pollution
to change its locale. 37 The domestic approach Professor Stewart describes is
34. Id. at 113. Professor Reich's numbers in this example have been criticized, specifically the cost
of a Pontiac Le Mans. See Steven Greenhouse, The New Presidency: The Labor Department; Nominee
Devoted Years to RehearsingforRole, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, § 1, at 18. Nevertheless, the international
web-like nature of this transaction and the basic ratio of the costs involved are, for our purposes, the key
factors.
35. REICH, supra note 8, at 113.
36. Stewart, supra note 4, at 2090-93.
37. Of course, manufacturing plants that already exist are not likely to be moved, but increased
investment in new facilities or expanding output in old facilities is more likely to occur in locations where
the overall costs of production are lower.
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thus a good model for the more global regulation that also is necessary if
problems such as greenhouse gas emissions and acid rain are to be solved.
Applying this domestic approach to global realities integrates local and global
regulation, thereby promoting the effectiveness of each. It also reinforces a
common regulatory discourse that blurs the line between global and local.
A contract approach to domestic regulation also emphasizes a more
comprehensive approach to the domestic environment than that which is
usually possible when multiple regulators seek to enforce traditional command-
and-control rules. Since many domestic companies often have multiple and
complex air and water pollution problems, their economic and technological
ability to solve these problems often requires that they think of these issues in
an interconnected way. A contract approach can provide needed flexibility for
both the company and the regulators to negotiate a settlement to their
problems. The two sides may thus work out an individually tailored regulatory
plan that is not only less costly for both the regulated and the regulators, but
likely to be more effective than blunt command-and-control regulatory tools
applied by multiple regulators.38 More holistic, negotiation-oriented models
of domestic regulation clearly will resonate with the kind of global, regulatory
approaches now emerging.39 This contract approach will make regulation not
only more efficient, but also more acceptable to the regulators and the
regulated.
B. Global Regulation and New Regulatory Structures
The global discourse described in Part I includes issues of trade, equity,
economic growth, and by implication population growth, as well as science and
technology. The Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion" and the Rio
Framework Convention4' dealing with greenhouse gases are early examples
of how the new global discourse creates legal innovations necessary to respond
to these various issues, and fuses international and domestic approaches to the
law.
42
38. Command-and-control, technology-based standards are found in most federal environmental
statutes. See e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1988);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1988).
39. Professor Stewart has advocated a similar comprehensive approach to the eventual elimination of
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive
Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83
(1992). This approach, however, understates the important wealth differences among developed and
developing countries. It also understates the effectiveness of a regulatory approach that focuses specifically
on the major greenhouse gas-CO2. See Thomas Drennen, After Rio: Measuring the Effectiveness of the
International Response, 15 LAW & POL'Y (forthcoming 1993). Nevertheless, this comprehensive approach
to greenhouse gases may make the process of global bargaining among the various nations responsible for
greenhouse gases easier to begin and thus make global legislative progress more likely.
40. Montreal Protocol, supra note I1.
41. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
42. For an explanation of the global discourse, see supra note 2 and accompanying text. It is important
1993] 2119
The Yale Law Journal
The Montreal Protocol and its amendments, as Professor Stewart notes, do
not disregard equity.43 In attempting to regulate CFC's and other ozone
depleting materials, the agreement is among the first to recognize the need to
treat less developed countries differently when it comes to formulating and
enforcing global legislation. The 1990 London Amendments to the Montreal
Protocol,44 for example, at least begin to address difficult problems, such as
technology transfer and wealth disparities, inherent in making such agreements
meaningful and possible for less developed countries to sign.45
The Montreal Protocol and its amendments are also technology-forcing
pieces of global legislation.46 For example, the Montreal Protocol's rigid
timetable for phasing out CFC's created a market for and thereby promoted the
development of substitutes.47 Consider, for example, the case of CFC-113,
widely used as a solvent in the manufacture of computer chips. During
discussions on phasing out CFC's, manufacturers claimed that CFC- 113 would
be too costly to replace.48 Yet it was the first of the CFC's to disappear after
researchers discovered an equally effective, inexpensive water and citrus-based
solution.49 Though economics suggests firms minimize costs, the cheaper
process was not discovered earlier.
The Protocol's regulatory structure had much to do with this. What is
crucial to the development of new green technologies is a strong commitment
to create a market for them. The firm timetable established by the Montreal
Protocol for phasing out CFC's meant that investment in substitutes had to
proceed in an aggressive fashion. Thus, to encourage the emergence of new
green technologies, it may be necessary, through law, to ensure that a market
will exist for them.
to recognize that the process of global regulation is often as important as the ultimate result that is reached.
While it may seem, for example, that initial framework conventions are relatively ineffectual, they can
trigger a regulatory process that eventually leads to much more significant results in the future. The
Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, is an excellent example. This is not to say that the Protocol has solved
all of the problems involved with ozone depletion, but the Protocol, too, must be viewed as the start, not
the end, of a long-term regulatory process. See generally BENEDICK, supra note 11, at 199-211; Aman,
supra note 30.
43. For a detailed discussion of equity and the equitable considerations embodied in the Montreal
Protocol, see AMAN, supra note 2, at 145-54, and BENEDICK, supra note 11, at 92-93.
44. See London Amendments, supra note 22.
45. See id.; BENEDICK, supra note II, at 148-62.
46. Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, art. 2 and annex A, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at 2-4, 26 I.L.M.
at 1552-53, 1561; London Amendments, supra note 22, arts. 2A, 2B, 30 I.L.M. at 539-40.
47. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1I, art. 2 and annex A, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 10, at 2-4, 26 I.L.M.
at 1552-53, 1561.
48. See BENEDICK, supra note 11, at 78.
49. See, e.g., Apple Computer Inc. Announces Worldwide Elimination of CFCs, 15 Int'l Envt'l Rep.
(BNA) 492 (July 29, 1992), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, INTENV File ("Apple Computer Inc. has
eliminated the use of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons to clean electronic assemblies and manufacturing
equipmenL....").
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Moreover, the Montreal Protocol has also helped develop a mechanism for
the creation and dissemination of information." Such information, essential
to enforcement, keeps everyone apprised of progress towards reducing CFC's
in the atmosphere. This aspect of knowledge creation and dissemination is a
key factor in the proposal for a Sustainable Development Commission made
at the first Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992.5' The purpose
of this Commission is to develop the information on emission levels of
greenhouse gases to enable it to determine whether any progress is being made
toward the agreed-upon goals of the framework convention. It is thus a new
international information agency enabling nations to monitor progress on this
important global issue-an environmental Amnesty International, but one that
includes representatives from various nation-states, thus giving it a multi-
national and global imprimatur.52
Inevitably, if it is to succeed, the global regulatory structure now
developing will have to solve a variety of complex problems, including how
developing countries can enjoy economic growth without adopting nineteenth-
or early twentieth-century approaches to industrialization. This is by far the
greatest challenge, particularly given the enormous disparities of wealth around
the world. Technology-forcing legislation can help promote new green
technologies which then could be shared worldwide in some equitable manner.
Intellectual property rights are held by private corporations, not by the
countries doing the negotiations for the creation of new global legislative
regimes.53 The end result is that it is difficult to facilitate the transfer of these
new technologies without expropriation, from the point of view of the holders
of these property rights, or a new form of economic colonialism, from the
point of view of the less developed countries. These, however, are some of the
50. Montreal Protocol, supra note 11, arts. 9(2) & (3), S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at 7, 26 I.L.M. at
1557.
51. There was a broad consensus in Rio to establish a high-level watchdog group to ensure that
individual governments respect the pledges they have made or will make in the future to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. The new international body, as proposed in a follow-up resolution to the Rio Earth Summit,
will be called the Sustainable Development Commission, and will rely heavily on evidence gathered by
private environmental groups. One model for the Commission was the U.N. Human Rights
Commission-one that seeks to shame countries into following policies that are environmentally sound.
This model would not have the power to impose sanctions or fines. Other models sought to be more
enforcement oriented. The United Nations, however, has adopted a resolution establishing a Commission
based more on the Human Rights Commission model. The Commission is to "monitor progress in
promoting, facilitating and financing, as appropriate, the access to and the transfer of environmentally sound
technologies and corresponding know-how, in particular to developing countries .... " Institutional
Arrangements to Follow up the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A147/719 (1992).
52. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution recommends that the Commission "consist of
representatives of 53 States elected by ECOSOC from amongst the Member-States of the United Nations
and its Specialized Agencies for three years terms with due regard to equitable geographical distribution."
Id
53. The Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, signed by 150 nations in
Rio, was resisted by the U.S. largely because it failed, in the view of the U.S., to adequately protect U.S.
intellectual property interests.
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regulatory problems for which solutions must be found. 4 Simply going about
our business on a domestic level as if we were not tied to the global demands
of an unequal world is no longer possible in the new global era.
CONCLUSION
The eggshell image of the global environment highlights the need for new
conceptualizations of national sovereignty and individual self-interest. The
global discourse now emerging expresses some of these conceptualizations. I
believe it will continue to do so, only in part because of the new consciousness
of the global environment itself. Additional factors are the structure of the
twenty-first-century corporation and the potential for market- and contract-
based regulatory approaches to promote a global discourse. The nineteenth-
century perspective inherent in Vosburg v. Putney 5 remains highly relevant
for the new century nearly upon us. That case emphasized responsibility for
harm done to a body that suffers from cumulative weakness. In the case of the
global discourse outlined here, that responsibility is collective, absolute, and
immediate. It affirms the capacity of legislators, scientists, and citizens to
expand their concept of self-interest in response to new information and
opportunities for environmental improvement.
Like Professor Stewart, I agree that environmental regulation in these times
requires new and more efficient domestic regulatory approaches, but this is not
because I believe pollution should be thought of merely as a commodity to be
bought and sold. In my view, these new regulatory approaches must not only
promote domestic industrial efficiency but also link domestic regulatory
regimes to the global discourse now developing. To the extent that new
approaches such as market-based regulation and environmental contracting
facilitate a more global conception of environmental regulation and deal more
effectively with new global corporate structures, they should be pursued. We
must evaluate the efficacy of domestic regulation in global terms. The
developed world can no longer accurately calculate its own self-interest
without considering fully the environmental and financial realities of the
developing world. In the global era of regulation now upon us, the global
regulatory discourse erases the old lines between "them" and "us" at least for
purposes of protecting the eggshell planet-and its present and future
inhabitants-from further harm.
54. It may be that a multilateral fund will be necessary to help pay royalties to entrepreneurs, thereby
preserving the incentives to develop new technologies, but also making it possible for the developing world
to afford them. For a discussion of possible solutions to technology transfer problems see Jason M. Patlis,
Note, The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol: A Prototype for Financial Mechanisms in Protecting
the Global Environment, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181, 203-205 (1992). The author points to the trust fund
mechanism utilized by the Montreal Protocol as a means of protecting and facilitating technology transfers.
55. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
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